Abstract. We extend the convergence result of Hofbauer and Sorin for the best response differential inclusions coming from a nonconcave, nonconvex continuous payoff function U (x, y). A counterexample shows that convergence to a Nash equilibrium may not be true if we attempt to generalize the result to a three-person nonzero sum game.
Introduction
A recent interesting paper by Hofbauer and Sorin [4] considers the best response differential inclusions for a given, continuous function U : X × Y → R, assumed to be concave-convex. Precisely, the best response dynamics they consider is the systemξ This system has been considered by several authors since at least 1991 (see [2] , for example). The main result of [4] is that the solution of the best response dynamics converges to a saddle point of the function U (x, y) as τ → ∞. This generalized earlier classical work which applied to zero sum matrix games. The practical importance of a convergence result for the best dynamics is the verification that using a best response strategy for each time is ultimately optimal.
The idea of the proof in [4] is to construct the natural function
and to show that τ → V (ξ(τ ), η(τ )) converges to 0 as τ → ∞, implying that V is a sort of Lyapunov function for the dynamics. As a consequence, every cluster point of (ξ(τ ), η(τ )) must be a saddle of U , and there must be cluster points if X and Y are compact.
The goal of this paper is to extend the Hofbauer-Sorin result in a substantial way to nonconcave-nonconvex payoff functions. We will not assume that U is concaveconvex, but merely that the best response sets are convex. This assumption is satisfied not only for concave-convex functions, but, more generally, for quasiconcavequasiconvex functions. Recall that a quasiconvex function f : A → R on a convex set A ⊂ R n is a function for which the sublevel sets {x ∈ A | f (x) ≤ a} are convex for all a ∈ R. Equivalently, f (λx + (1 − λ)y) ≤ f (x) ∨ f (y), ∀ x, y ∈ A, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. A function f is quasiconcave if −f is quasiconvex.
Just as the extension of the classical von Neumann minimax theorem to the Sion minimax theorem is not straightforward, there are substantial problems encountered in generalizing the Hofbauer-Sorin result. The main problem is that if only quasiconcavity-quasiconvexity is assumed, none of the inequalities used to prove that V decreases along the trajectories are valid. The idea in this paper is to replace U with the concave and convex envelopes of U in each individual variable. It is clear that it is not possible to turn U into a concave-convex function simultaneously. While this idea gives us something to work with, it does not turn out to be enough. The concave and convex envelopes have to be modified so that they contact the original function U only at maximum points (in x) and minimum points (in y). This turns out to be a little tricky, but, fortunately, the supremal and infimal convolutions (or Moreau-Yosida convolutions) will satisfy those properties, as we prove in a lemma below.
Starting from U we construct the envelopes U ± and then U ± k (the convolutions for fixed k > 0), and we work throughout with U ± k . U + k (x, y) will be concave in x and U − k (x, y) will be convex in y. Our conclusion, however, is that the best response dynamics defined using the functions U ± k have trajectories which cluster in the set of saddle points for U .
Examples exhibited in the second section show that the constructions we use to get convergence are essential. Our first example starts with a discontinuous quasiconcave-quasiconvex payoff function, and we do not use the envelopes or the convolutions. It shows that we may start at a saddle point for U , and yet the best response dynamics converge to a point which is not a saddle point. The second example takes a continuous quasiconcave-quasiconvex function U and shows nonconvergence of the best response dynamics to the saddle set.
Finally, in the last section we exhibit an example answering the question as to whether or not a similar convergence result can be obtained for a Nash equilibrium. Our example is a three player nonzero sum game in which the payoff function for each player is actually strictly convex (the players want to minimize their cost). There is a unique Nash equilibrium at (0, 0, 0). If we construct the best response dynamics we get a system of three linear differential equations. The solution of this system, starting from any nonzero initial point, converges to a cycle. The dynamics do not converge to the Nash equilibrium. Shapley [6] has given an example of a bimatrix game in which the discrete BR dynamics do not converge to a Nash equilibrium.
Convergence to a saddle
We are given a function U : X × Y → R, where X ⊂ R n and Y ⊂ R m are compact and convex. Assume throughout this paper that
In order to simplify the presentation we will assume the following condition on U :
This assumption can be weakened, as we will see later. Under this assumption it is well known (using the Sion minimax theorem) that there is a saddle value of U in the sense that
Remark 2.1. One of the primary goals of the paper [4] is to prove the von Neumann minimax theorem by use of the best response dynamical system. By contrast, we assume conditions sufficient to guarantee the existence of a saddle point for U .
Since we are not going to assume any concavity-convexity properties of U , we introduce the functions U ± which will have the convexity properties we need. Define the envelopes on X × Y by
is the greatest convex minorant of U (x, ·) as a function of y for each fixed x. Similarly, U + (·, y) is the smallest concave majorant of U (·, y) as a function of x for each fixed y. We may use the Fenchel conjugates to explicitly construct U ± by
Also,
In addition we will need the following useful characterization. We have that
The lower semicontinuity of y → U (·, y) guarantees that U − (x, ·) = U * * (x, ·), and the upper semicontinuity of x → U (x, ·) guarantees the equality U + (·, y) = U ## (·, y). The next lemma gives some basic properties of U ± .
Lemma 2.2. We have
Proof. Part (1) is obvious by construction.
For part (2) , lower semicontinuity of U − (x, y) in (x, y) ∈ X × Y comes from the fact that parametric minimization preserves that property; see, for example, [7, Theorem 1.17 ]. Convexity of U − (x, y) in y ∈ Y comes directly from the definition of U − . Upper semicontinuity, and hence continuity, of U − (x, y) in x for a fixed y can be shown using the fact that the minimum defining
Properties of U + follow by symmetry.
.
In a similar way, it will then follow that
The next lemma tells us that the convex envelope of a lower semicontinuous function has the same minimum as the original function and that the concave envelope of an upper semicontinuous function has the same maximum.
Lemma 2.3. For any lower semicontinuous function
where f * * is the greatest convex minorant of f (the second Fenchel conjugate). For any upper semicontinuous function f : X → R we have
where f ## is the smallest concave majorant of f .
Proof. We only prove the first statement. Under our assumptions f is bounded from below, so all the infima are finite. Since
The previous lemma allows us to conclude that y → U − (x, y) has the same minimum as y → U (x, y) and that x → U + (x, y) has the same maximum as x → U (x, y). Unfortunately, it is possible that U − (x, y) = U (x, y) at some point (x, y) ∈ X × Y , and yet the y-component of this point is not a minimizer of U (x, y), for x fixed. That is, the convex envelope of U in y can contact U at points other than minimizers of U . The amazing thing is that if we take the inf convolution (also known as the Moreau convolution) of U − in the y variable, the resulting function will still be convex but will only contact U − on the minimum set of U − , and that coincides with the minimum set of U . A similar statement holds for U + . To recall the definition and properties of the Moreau convolutions we define for each k > 0, each x ∈ X, and each y ∈ R m the inf convolution
Similarly, for each x ∈ R n and each y ∈ Y , the sup convolution is given by
We will fix k > 0 throughout this paper. Properties of the inf and sup convolutions are well known, and we summarize their main points in the following lemma. Apart from the convexity of U − k (x, ·) and concavity of U + (·, y), properties (8) and (9) are the main properties we need.
Lemma 2.4. Define the functions
We have the properties:
) is single valued and continuous, and Df
is single valued and continuous, and
Proof. Properties (1)- (4) For property (6) , observe that
, completing the proof of (6) .
To see (8), we will show that for a convex lower semicontinuous function f :
where f * (p) is the conjugate of f . We have f *
This implies that p 0 = 0. Consequently, x 0 must be a minimizer of f . A proof of (9) which requires no convex analysis proceeds as follows. Let f : Y → R be a concave function and suppose that
where the last strict inequality follows from f (z)−f (y) > 0. This is a contradiction. Thus, if f k (y) = f (y) for some y ∈ Y , then y is a maximum of f .
Notice that , y) we have equality throughout. Throughout the rest of this paper we fix k > 0. Now we set
We define X(U )×Y (U ) as the set of saddle points of U . This notation is justified by the following remark.
Remark 2.5. When U (x, y) is quasiconcave-quasiconvex on X × Y , the set of saddle points is a Cartesian product of convex sets. This follows from the following facts.
For any two saddle points, ( 
. This shows that the set of saddle points is a product set.
Lemma 2.6. If U has a saddle value, i.e. (2.1) holds, then
Of course, if U is quasiconcave-quasiconvex, then (2.1) holds. It is worth noting that this is the only place in which we need to assume that (2.1) holds. If it was automatically true or if somehow it could be deduced that V ≥ 0 as it is in the concave-convex case, then we would actually prove the existence of a saddle point, exactly as in [4] .
Proof. We have from (2.1), (2.5), and Lemma 2.4,
Now we consider the best response dynamics. We need to introduce the best response sets. Proof. This is Theorem 1.17 in [7] , so we only indicate the proof for BR Let y n ∈ BR + 2 (x n ) and assume that X x n → x ∈ X and Y y n → y ∈ Y . We must show y ∈ BR , y) , and, since α was arbitrary, inf y U
Here is the best response dynamics. Fix a point (x, y) ∈ X × Y . Define ξ(0) = x, η(0) = y, and for τ > 0,
Translated, this means that for all τ ≥ 0,
Observe that α depends on η and β depends on ξ so that the differential inclusions form a coupled system. Standard results in differential inclusions ([5, Theorem 3, p. 98]) give us the existence of an absolutely continuous solution (ξ(·), η(·)) for all time τ ≥ 0.
Lemma 2.9. Consider v(τ
Proof. Since precise details for the concave-convex case are given in [4] , we give only a sketch of the proof. We have from [7, Theorem 10.13, p. 433 
Using the lemma we compute using the convexity of y → U − k (·, y) and concavity 
At this point we have shown that
Equivalently, for any 0 ≤ s < t
That is,
This says that (ξ(·), η(·)) is a monotone trajectory with respect to the functions (V, F ) of the differential inclusion
. Therefore, using [5, Theorem 3, p. 311], we conclude that (ξ(τ ),ξ(τ )), (η(τ ),η(τ )) have almost cluster points (x * , v * ), (y * , w * ), respectively, as τ → ∞, and
In addition,
For the reader's convenience we recall that x * is an almost cluster point of ξ(τ ) when τ → ∞ if for any ε > 0, the set {τ ∈ [0, ∞) | |ξ(τ ) − x * | ≤ ε} has infinite Lebesgue measure. Now we combine the facts U
, inequalities (2.5), and Lemma 2.4(8) and (9) to conclude that
and so (α * , β * ) is a saddle point for U . We have established the following theorem. 
We still have to prove that the actual trajectories of the best response dynamics have almost cluster points which are actually saddle points and not just (α, β). To see why this is true, let ε > 0 and let T ε be a set of infinite Lebesgue measure such that for τ ∈ T ε , α(τ ) ∈ X(U ) + εB, where B is the closed until ball. We know that such T ε exists because of Theorem 2.11. For simplicity, denote
where π X ε (x) denotes the projection of x onto the closed convex set X ε . We have,
The last inequality follows from the fact that Remark 2.13. The assumptions of continuity and quasiconcavity-quasiconvexity of U can be weakened. In fact, what was really used in the proofs of Theorem 2.11 and Theorem 2.12 is the following:
• the best response mappings BR • the function U has a saddle value on X × Y . The two conditions of course hold when U is continuous and quasiconcave in x and quasiconvex in y, but they may hold in other cases as well.
Examples
Example 1. Our first example exhibits a quasiconcave-quasiconvex function for which the best response dynamics, using only the function U (x, y) and not the convex envelopes, do not work. In fact, there is a solution that starts at a saddle point of U and converges to a point that is not a saddle point. The augmented dynamics, based on the concave and convex hulls, fix this issue, i.e., give convergence to the saddle set. This shows that even though a quasiconcave -quasiconvex function is known to have a saddle point, the best response dynamics will not necessarily converge to it.
Then U (x, y) is quasiconcave and upper semicontinuous in x for each fixed y and is quasiconvex, in fact convex, and lower semicontinuous in y for each fixed x. The set of saddle points is [0, 1] × {0}. The best response maps are
and
The first observation is that BR 2 is not upper semicontinuous at x = 0.
The second observation is that
is a solution, in the Carathéodory and in the classical sense, to the best response dynamicsξ . Thus, for (3.1) and all t ≥ 0, 0 ∈ BR 1 (η(t)), 1 ∈ BR 2 (ξ(t)), and so (3.1), being the solution toξ = −ξ,η = 1 − η from (ξ(0), η(0)) = (1, 0), is a solution to the best response dynamics. Note that (1, 0) is a saddle point of U , while lim t→∞ (ξ(t), η(t)) = (0, 1) is not. Our third observation is that using the augmented best response dynamics eliminates this particular troublesome solution. Indeed, we have the envelopes U − (x, y) = U (x, y), U + (x, y) = (1 − x)y, and the augmented best response is
Then, for x ∈ (0, 1], y ∈ (0, 1], the augmented best response dynamics areξ = −ξ,η = −η, and (3.1) is not a solution. Observe as well that we do not need to use the inf and sup convolutions of U − and U + , respectively, to fix the problem here.
One may obviously ask the question if the nonconvergence of the best response dynamics in this example is due to the choice of a discontinuous payoff function. Our next example will show that this is not the case. 
is a solution, in the Carathéodory sense, to the best response dynamics. In Figure 1 on the left we plot the solutions of the best response dynamics as well as v(τ ) = |ξ(τ )| + |η(τ )|. On the right we indicate the convergence of (ξ(τ ), η(τ )) → (0, 0) along the surface of the payoff function U (x, y) = xy.
Figure 1. V strictly decreases along trajectories
As indicated, the function v(τ ), which is the highest function in the figure, strictly decreases along the trajectories, which converge to the unique saddle point (x * , y * ) = (0, 0). The curves below v(τ ) are |ξ(τ )|, |η(τ )|. Observe that they do not decrease.
Best response dynamics don't work for Nash equilibria
We construct a 3-player, nonzero sum game for which the best response dynamics do not converge to a Nash equilibrium for the game.
The three players each have the individual payoff functions This is a homogeneous linear system which produces the eigenvalues λ = −3, ±i.
The solution of this system with initial point (x(0), y(0), z(0)) = (1, 1, 1) is . If the players start at p 1 = (1, 0, 0) ∈ X, q 1 = (0, 1, 0) ∈ Y , it can be shown that the BR dynamics do not converge to the Nash equilibrium.
